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"THE MONSTER APPROACHING THE CAPITAL:"*
THE EFFORT TO WRITE ECONOMIC POLICY INTO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE STATES are asking Congress to call a constitutional convention under
Article V of the United States Constitution to propose an amendment
requiring a balanced federal budget. This movement began in the mid 1970's,
and quickly gained momentum.' To date, thirty' of the necessary thirty-
four states have made applications, with New Hampshire the most recent in
the spring of 1979.' Credit for this swift and comprehensive drive has been
given to the National Taxpayers Union.' Governor Jerry Brown of California
also promoted this movement in his 1979 inaugural speech.' In spite of
his support, however, the California legislature rejected the convention
after hearing extensive testimony before its Ways and Means Committee.'
The deliberation by the California legislature is not characteristic of
the treatment given this proposal by other states. The majority of other state
legislatures did not hold committee hearings and debates were brief. The
voting reflected the legislators' general attitude concerning the goal of a
balanced federal budget, and not necessarily their well-reasoned commitment
to a constitutional convention call, or its ramifications.' The state applications
themselves reflect this uncertainty. Many of the state applications seek a
constitutional convention as an alternative to congressional inaction on this
matter.' Others contain "self-destruct" provisions whereby the application
would be deemed void and rescinded if Congress proposes such an amend-
ment through the alternative method of Article V.' Still others, some of
*Appreciation is extended to William Safire for coining this apt phrase. Safire, Reagan
Crystal Ball, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1981, at A3, col. 6.
'S. Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1981).
2Id. at 12-13.
3 Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1979). See 125 CoNG. REC. S6085 (daily ed. May 16, 1979) for the text of
New Hampshire's application.
4 Mohr, Tax Union Playing Chief Role in Drive, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1979, at D18 col. 1.
See S. Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13, 16 (1981).
5 Gunther, supra note 3, at 2.
6Id. at 4 and n.11.
7Id. at 3-4. See also id. at 19, discussing the Montana legislature's deliberation on this issue.
A resolution was almost passed in 1979 which would have made Montana the thirtieth state
to apply for a constitutional convention. One legislator, just before the final vote, urged his
colleagues to consider the significance of its passage as if they were, in fact, the thirty-fourth
state. The Montana legislature did not approve the resolution.
8 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah and Virginia. The text of the state applications can be found in sources listed in App.
at p. 750, infra. Cf. Wyoming J. Res. 1, 125 CONG. REc. S1313 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
9 Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Georgia
And South Dakota. See App. at p. 750, infra.
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which are included in both the aforementioned groups, have deemed them-
selves "continuing applications" for a convention.' Some state applications
do not contemplate action by Congress, but simply ask Congress to call
a convention for proposing a balanced budget amendment." One character-
istic common to almost all state applications is the desire to limit the scope
of the convention to constitutional restraints on federal spending with the
goal of achieving a balanced budget." These delimiting provisions within
the applications evidence the suspicion of a runaway convention." The
only other constitutional convention in our history took place in Philadelphia
in 1787. Under the Articles of Confederation, there was no authority to
propose a new constitution at the convention, nor to wander from the specific
subject matter contained within the proposals by the state legislatures. How-
ever, once assembled, a wholly new constitution emerged for ratification by
the states despite protests that the delegates lacked this power. "
Article V of the United States Constitution" provides two methods for
proposing amendments. The twenty-six amendments which are now part of the
Constitution have been initiated by the first method-they were proposed by
a two-thirds vote of Congress, and subsequently ratified by three-fourths of
the states. The thirty state applications currently before Congress are brought
through the uncharted waters of the second method.
10 Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota and Tennessee. See App. at p. 750, infra. Cf. Arizona,
S.J. Res. 1002, 125 CONG. REc. S1306 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
"Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana and North Dakota. See App. at p. 750, infra.
12But see, 125 CONG. REC. S1310 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). The application of North
Dakota, rather than specifying that its call is for the "specific and exclusive purpose" of
proposing some variant of a balanced budget amendment, asks that a convention be called
"for such purposes as provided by Article V of the Constitution,"
This may be recognition on the part of the North Dakota legislature that because the
convention mode of amending the Constitution is completely untested and Congress has not
yet legislated guidelines, no one is certain whether a "limited" convention can be called.
However, in the 1st Session of the 97th Congress, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah intro-
duced a bill which would institute procedures for calling a convention under Article V.
This bill was approved November 3, 1981, by the Constitution Subcommittee and is now
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. S. 817, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CoNG. Rac. S2794
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 1981).
Is Gunther, supra note 3, at 4. Reportedly, the advocates of a balanced budget amendment
have assured others that a convention "is not likely to come about" because the real aim is
to "spur" Congress to propose its own amendment, and additionally, that even if it is con-
vened, it will be limited to the consideration of only that amendment. Id.
'4 Van Alstyne, Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited Conventions Only?
- A Letter to a Colleague, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1298 (1979).
15 U.S. CONsT. art. V. states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall pro-
pose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which,
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con-
ventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress , ,.
(Voel. 15:4
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Many thorny issues are raised by the prospect of a new constitutional
convention. Congressional duties and limitations when acting on the state
applications are unclear. For example, is Congress under an absolute duty
to call the convention if the thirty-fourth application is properly tendered;
what discretion is allowed in evaluating the applications; can Congress set
standards for form and timeliness; can the scope or purpose of the con-
vention be limited; and if so, and the delegates stray from the limited pur-
pose, what will be the effect.
It is not within the scope of this comment to answer all the above
issues. The focus of this paper will be a review of solutions suggested by
Constitutional scholars with an emphasis on current proposed legislation.
The Constitutional Implementation Act of 198116 (hereinafter S.817) and
S.J. Res. 58.17 The current Congressionally-proposed amendment will be dis-
cussed in relation to the state applications. A brief review of the legislative
history behind Article V will highlight the current efforts by Congress to pro-
vide some procedural guidelines for a state-summoned convention. Finally,
the provisions of the various state applications will be compared. As a preface
to this discussion, the nature and activities of the organizations credited
with sponsoring this movement will be addressed.
II. SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENT
The major sponsors of this attempt to summon a national convention
under Article V are the National Taxpayers Union (hereinafter N.T.U.) and
the American Farm Bureau Federation." N.T.U. is a public affairs organiza-
tion formed to marshall public opinion. With a membership numbering
100,000, N.T.U. is committed to the reduction of government spending, pro-
tecting taxpayers' rights, and reducing taxes generally. 9 Its activities include
a lobbying effort in Washington, D.C.2" and at the state level." Due to
N.T.U. persistence in the 1970's, a growing number of state legislatures
began to adopt provisions placing spending and taxing limitations within
their state constitutions." The most significant efforts resulted in Proposi-
tion 13 and Proposition 4 in California."3
16 S. 817, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2794 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1981); see supra
note 12.
17 S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2905 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1981). S.J.
Res. 58 has cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee and its Constitution Subcommittee, and
is currently ready for floor debate in the Senate. Constitutional Amendment On Budgets Is
Reported Out, Wash. Post, May 20, 1981, at A7, col. c; Panel Backs Balanced Budget
Amendment, Wash. Post, May 8, 1981, at A3, col. c. See infra note 108, for the text of
SJ. Res. 58.
Is S. Rep. No. 151, supra note 1. See Mohr, supra note 4.
19 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssocI AnoNs 1031 (16th ed. 1981).
20N.T.U. is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
21 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOcATnONS 1031 (16th ed. 1981).
22 S. Rep. No. 151, supra note 1, at 12-13.
28 Id.
COMMENTS
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N.T.U. president, George Snyder, and the legislative director, David
Keating, and Harry Bell, President of the South Carolina Farm Bureau
Federation, offered testimony regarding the proposed balanced budget
amendment of the 97th Congress, S.J. Res. 58, before the Senate Sub-
committee on the Constitution. " Chairman Hatch specifically noted the
efforts of N.T.U. and the National Tax Limitation Committee in reporting
out the resolution.2
The American Farm Bureau Federation, a conglomeration of 49 state
farm bureaus, analyzes the problems of its member bureaus and "formu-
lates action to achieve educational improvement, economic opportunity,
and social advancement."' Its purported membership is over three million.
Besides lending its support to the constitutional amendment movement,
it has recently brought suit against three federal agencies in an effort to
curtail further federal disbursement of funds to the United Farm Workers."'
It has also resisted efforts to raise the minimum wage paid alien farm
workers.28
III. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF ARTICLE V
If these sponsoring organizations are successful in their efforts and
Congress calls a constitutional convention under Article V, what will be the
contours of this convention? The state applications operate on the pre-
sumption that the scope of the convention can be limited to proposing a
balanced budget amendment. Legislative history underlying Article V must
be analyzed in order to determine whether this is what was contemplated
by the inclusion of this mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Although the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention generally agreed
that an easier amendment process than was available under the Articles
of Confederation was needed,29 they were also aware of the need for per-
manency in the federal structure. They therefore rejected a motion re-
quiring ratification by two-thirds of the states, and settled on ratification
by three-fourths.3" The resolution of this issue was easier than that of the
convention proposal method for amendments. The draft that emerged from
the Committee of Detail in August, 1787 contemplated excluding the "Na-
241d. at 15. N.T.U. officers testified on May 20, 1981, and Harry Bell on April 9, 1981.
25 1d. at 12-13.
26 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 283 (16th ed. 1981).
27 N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1980, at 8, col. 6.
28 N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, at 8, col. 1.
29 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII. No alteration of the Articles of Confederation
was possible unless agreed to by Congress and confirmed by the legislatures of all the States,
thereby giving each state a veto power to prevent any amendments to it. U.S.C. xxxv, xxxviii
(1976). See Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention,
88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624-25 (1979).80 Dellinger, supra note 29, at 1625.
[Vol. 15:4
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tional Legislature" from the amendment process."1 Initiation of amendments
would be the states' sole province with the congressional role limited to
calling the convention, and that convention would be the sole source of
amendments, apparently without the need for ratification by the states."2
The resolution of this issue was difficult because of the differing views re-
flected by the localist and centralist positions." "Localists feared that [a]
wholly autonomous convention could subvert states' rights.""4 The centralist
view, as represented by Hamilton, opposed this method on the ground that
barring the National Legislature from any role in initiating amendments would
threaten the national structure and unduly accord power to the states. 5
Madison then offered a compromise draft which was tentatively adopted by
the Convention:86
The Legislature of the U-S-- whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legis-
latures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this Con-
stitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part thereof,
when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of
the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
the Legislatures of the U.S: 7
Madison's draft resembles what eventually became Article V. Congress
would have been the sole proposing source of amendments, but would re-
spond to initiation of amendments by the states. However, the convention
method of proposing amendments was not provided for in Madison's draft.
After the debates on Madison's draft, the constitutional convention
scheme resurfaced. 8 The delegates voted to substitute language providing
for a constitutional convention when two-thirds of the states applied. 9 Un-
fortunately, records of the accompanying debate do not shed much light on
the reason for the changes."0 Roger Sherman expressed "fears" that under
Madison's proposal the three-fourths majority of states upon ratification of
an amendment proposed by Congress might derogate the rights of individual
states, such as denying their equality in the Senate or abolishing them alto-
gether." Mason objected because he thought it gave Congress too much
31 Gunther, supra note 3, at 14.
321d.
$31d.
34 Id.
3e Id.
86 Id.
37 II THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVrIuMON OF 1787, at 559 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited as 11 Farrand].
38 Id. at 629. See Dellinger, supra note 29, at 1628.
89 11 Farrand, supra note 37, at 630. See Dellinger, supra note 29, at 1628.
40 Il Farrand, supra note 37, at 629-33.
41 Dellinger, supra note 29, at 1629.
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control.42 In his view, under both modes of Madison's draft, the states had to
depend ultimately on Congress, and if the federal government became too
oppressive, the states would be wholly dependent upon Congress for
the proposing of new amendments. "3 These objections sounded the need
for some protection of state interest over federal interest. Both suggest the
need for the autonomy of the constitutional convention.
The final draft that emerged from the Philadelphia Convention and
which is now Article V of the Constitution" grants parallel methods for
the proposing of amendments: by Congress with two-thirds majority of both
Houses, or by a convention upon the application of two-thirds of the states.
The congressional role in the second method is limited to calling the con-
vention. Based on the Philadelphia Convention as the only historical model
upon which to interpret the authority of such a convention, it would seem
that its drafters and delegates intended that in future conventions there
should be a high degree of autonomy to address any issue which the dele-
gates may consider of national interest. To conclude that Congress has
other than a ministerial function"5 in the convention process would be a
strained construction of the meaning and purpose of Article V in light of
the legislative history and the only historical model available.
IV. THE SCOPE AND AUTHORITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The thirty state applications currently calling for a constitutional conven-
tion are seeking something quite apart from what the drafters of Article V pre-
saged. Almost all of the state applications use similar language in seeking
42 Id.
43 Id. Dellinger interpreted Mason's objection as reflecting his belief in the need for a con-
stitutional convention having broad authority to propose, draft, debate and revise amend-
ments; it should not be subject to the sole proposing authority of Congress as under Madison's
scheme because Congress might choose to ignore the suggested texts of amendments ema-
nating from the states.
4 See supra note 15, for the text.
45 Congress would be under a duty to call a convention. Incident to this duty would be the
power of Congress to establish the means preliminarily necessary for the convention: a designa-
tion of the time and place of meeting, and the appointment of temporary presiding officer(s)
until the delegates could select their own. Thereafter Congressional power over the convention
should be suspended to allow the states' delegates to freely exercise the amendment-proposing
power guaranteed them by Article V. Congressional participation would finally be exercised
to provide the mechanism for ratification of any emerging amendments in the manner it
may choose under Article V.
Currently before the Senate Judiciary Committee is S. 817 which would implement
the procedure for the calling of a constitutional convention. Sponsored by Senators Hatch
and DeConcini, S. 817 envisions an active role for Congress in determining the convening
and scope of the convention. Pursuant to § 6(a) of S. 817, it would be the duty of each
House of Congress to determine whether each application is valid with respect to the same
general subject matter. Congress would have the authority to limit the subject matter of the
convention, and reject state applications which fall outside this limitation. Pursuant to § 11(b),
Congress would have the authority to block the submission of any proposed amendment
emanating from the convention to the states for ratification. If a proposed amendment "re-
lates to or includes a general subject which differs from or was not included as one of the
general subjects" to which Congress has deemed the convention limited, Congress could by
a concurrent resolution refuse to transmit it for ratification by the states. S. 817.
[Vol. 15:4
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a convention "for the specific and exclusive purpose" of proposing an
amendment requiring some variant form of a balanced federal budget."
These applications clearly envision a limited-purpose convention. 7 Several
state applications even contain a provision whereby they will simply self-
destruct should the convention "not be limited to such specific and exclusive
purpose" as recited therein. 8 Within the application of one state is its own
restrictive interpretation of Article V and the scope of any convention called
pursuant to it.4 9
There is some discussion among the constitutional scholars that a
limited-purpose convention is an anomaly. In a letter addressed to the
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee of the 92nd Congress which
was considering the passage of a bill similar to the current S. 817, Pro-
fessor Charles L. Black, Jr. of the Yale Law School expressed his outrage
at the absence of any constitutional basis for such legislation. Black's
conclusion was premised on the impossibility of a limited convention ac-
cording to his reading of the relevant Article V phrase.51 He interprets
" 'a Convention for proposing Amendments' [to] mean 'a convention for
proposing such amendments as that convention decides to propose.' "52
According to Black's analysis, a limited-purpose convention would never
be called because a state application which asks for a single purpose con-
vention is asking for something which Article V does not contemplate,
therefore, Congress would be under no obligation to summon such a con-
vention. Even if thirty-four applications were before it, Congress would not
46 Variations include requiring simply a balanced federal budget; requiring that federal
"costs" not exceed "income", or federal expenditures not exceed revenues; or requiring that
federal appropriations may not exceed revenues. The majority use language similar to the
last variation. See App. at p. 750, infra.
47 Quite apart from the consideration of whether Congress can limit the scope and purpose of
a constitutional convention is whether the various state legislatures can by their applications
bind the prospective convention delegates to that single national issue to which each appli-
cation is addressed.
48 The Iowa, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Idaho and Colorado applications contain a
provision whereby they should be deemed "null and void, rescinded, and of no effect" in the
event of such a contingency. North Carolina's application includes a similar provision. But
perhaps the most unambiguous provision is that of Utah which provides that its application
can be counted in the convention call only if the convention is limited to the subject matter
of its resolution. See App. at p. 750, infra.
4 gDel. H.C. Res. No. 36 (1975). See 125 CONG. REC. S1307 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). Dela-
ware's application contains the following language:
[T]he General Assembly interprets Article V to mean that if two-thirds of the states
make applications for a convention to propose an identical amendment to the Con-
stitution for ratification with a limitation that such amendment be the only matter be-
fore it, that such convention would have the power only to propose the specified
amendment and would be limited to such proposal and would not have power to vary
the text thereof nor would it have power to propose other amendments on the same
or different propositions.
50 Black, Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972).
51 ld. at 197-204.
82Id. at 199.
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be obliged to call a limited-purpose convention because "[t]hirty-four
times zero is zero. 53
In considering whether a state application for a limited convention
could be construed as an application for an unlimited convention, Black
answers negatively.5" Characterizing this inference as "absurd both logically
and politically,"55 such an argument would have to rest upon the assump-
tion that a state, by seeking a limited convention, is also indicating its
interest in an open-agenda convention, where any subject might be broached.
Black's argument here has special force when it is applied to the current
states' drive for a balanced budget amendment. In addition to the general
subject matter of their applications, these thirty applications have one
common characteristic-they seek to limit the scope of the convention to
that solitary matter.5" It is evident from the texts of the applications that
the state legislatures considered and expressly rejected an unlimited con-
vention.
Professor Van Alstyne of Duke University takes exception to Pro-
fessor Black's basic premise.57 After restating and amplifying the arguments
posed by Black, he describes the argument that the only constitutional con-
vention contemplated by Article V is an open and free-wheeling one as a
"Catch 22" interpretation. Although a state should pose its application
with a bona fide "willingness to have a truly open convention,"5 9 and its
legislative resolution inconsistent with this understanding should not be
counted by Congress in the tally as a valid application," he nevertheless
concludes that such a general convention is the least likely to be contem-
plated by disgruntled states. 1 Van Alstyne foresees a "particular event, an
untoward happening ' as being the most likely triggering device for paral-
lel state resolutions. As such, he argues that Congress would be under a
constitutional obligation to call a convention. This type of convention
would provide a vehicle for modest change.
Even under Van Alstyne's analysis, the current applications for a bal-
anced budget amendment would be invalid since they evidence no "bona
fide willingness" to accept the prospect of an unlimited convention. The
majority of them condition their application for a convention on the "specific
53 Id. at 198.
54 Id. at 200.
5 5 1d.
56 See infra note 63 and the accompanying text for variations in the language of the appli-
cations.
57 Van AIstyne, supra note 14, at 1295.
58 ld. at 1304.
5
9Id. at 1301.
60 Id. at 1300.
61 Id. at 1305.
6 21d.
[V/ol. 15:4
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and exclusive purpose" of proposing some variant form of a balanced bud-
get amendment."3 One state proposes its own text for such an amendment, then
provides for its application to be considered by Congress only with those which
propose an "identical" amendment."4 Its legislature included its own interpre-
tation of an Article V convention, and in its application stated, that "such
amendment would be the only matter before it, that such convention would
have power only to propose the specified amendent and would be limited
to such proposal and would not have power... to propose other amendments
on the same or different propositions." 5 Clearly this state contemplates a
simple vote on the amendment and a convention with no proposing au-
thority nor power over its agenda.6" Another state which offers a proposed
text for the amendment rather than embarking upon an interpretation of
Article V seeks a convention for "such purposes as provided by Article V
of the Constitution."" Two other states offer a text for the proposed amend-
ment, and suggest that the convention be limited to this matter. 8
One may construe these delimiting provisions in the applications as
not negating a "bona fide willingness" for an unlimited convention, but
rather accepting this eventuality and simply limiting their intent for this
specific call. However when one considers the haste with which the resolu-
tions were passed, and the guarantees of their promoters," such a con-
struction would be strained indeed.
Professor Dellinger is another advocate of the view that state applica-
tions which limit the purpose and scope of the convention should be de-
63Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. North Carolina asks Congress to call a convention for the
"exclusive" purpose of proposing a balanced budget amendment. Closely related to this
category are the applications of Florida and Kansas which ask for a convention limited to
the "sole purpose" and "sole and exclusive purpose" respectively of some variant form of
a balanced budget amendment. See App. at p. 750, infra.
64 See the text of the Delaware application at supra note 49.
65 Id. (Emphasis added).
" Van Alstyne characterizes this type of application as envisioning a convention which Con-
gress could least decline to call. Van Alstyne, supra note 57, at 1305. However, it would
seem that this type of application does not at all evidence a "bona fide willingness" to have
a truly open convention.
87 N.D.S.C. Res. 4018 at 125 CONG. RFc. S1310 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). See supra note 12.
68 The relevant phrasing is: "for the proposing of the following amendment," Miss. H.C.
Res. 51 at 125 CONG. REc. S1308 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979); "for the purpose of considering
and proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to require that ...
[text]", Tenn. H.J. Res. 22 at 125 CONG. REc. S1312 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). Louisiana
also proposes a text for the amendment, and asks that "the purview of any convention
called by the Congress pursuant to this resolution be strictly limited to the consideration
of an amendment of the nature as herein proposed," La. S.C. Res. 73 at 125 CONG. REC.
S1307 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). Although Arizona and Nevada provide no text for the
proposed amendment, their applications indicate the general nature of the amendment, and
seek a convention limited to that purpose. Ariz. H.C. Mem. 2320 at 125 CONG. REC. S1306
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979); Nev. S.J. Res. 22 at 125 CONG. REc. S1309 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
69See supra note 13.
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clared invalid by Congress. He interprets the legislative history and debates
behind Article V as presenting two themes:
Congress should not have exclusive power to propose amendments;
and state legislatures should not be able to propose and ratify amend-
ments that enhance their power at the expense of the national govern-
ment. States were empowered under Article V to ratify amendments; the
power to propose amendments was lodged in two national bodies,
Congress and a convention. 0
A necessary corollary to this argument is that if the state legislatures were
permitted to limit the scope of the convention to a specific subject, the
proposal power which was intended to be lodged in a national convention
would then be shifted to the state legislatures.7' This result was not the
intent of the drafters of Article V. According to Dellinger, since the con-
vention mode of proposing amendments was one in which Congress was
to play no significant role, the state applications which ask Congress to
limit the subject matter of such a convention are requesting something which
Congress cannot grant. 2 Therefore, he reasons, the applications are in-
valid. 3 Dellinger, like Van Alstyne, suggests that Congress should be con-
vinced that the state legislatures applying for a convention should have a
proper understanding of the unbridled authority of the prospective con-
vention.7"
Although Professor Gunther seems to agree with Dellinger's position
that a constitutional convention would be a separate body beyond the
control of the applying states or Congress, he disagrees that a limited con-
vention may not be called. Gunther says that a single issue convention
may be called by Congress, but ultimately the scope of its agenda rests upon
its own authority. Congress may specify the purpose of the convention, but
this would be no more than a "moral exhortation" to the convention dele-
gates."
V. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING
A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
There have been other recent struggles with the virgin process of
amending the Constitution through the convention mode of Article V. The
Supreme Court decisions in Baker v. Carr" and Reynolds v. Sims"8 establish-
70 Dellinger, supra note 29, at 1630.
71/d.
7 2Id. at 1637.
73 Id. at 1638.
74 Id. at 1637.
75 Gunther, supra note 3, at 13.
76Id.
77 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
78 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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ing the "one-person-one-vote" principle and applying it to state legislative
apportionment procedures met with opposition. Through the efforts of the
Council of State Governments and Senator Everett Dirksen, a national
campaign was launched to summon a constitutional convention to address
the apportionment controversy."9 By 1967, thirty-two state legislatures had
passed resolutions applying for a constitutional convention under Article
V.SO A debate within Congress concerning this untested method of propos-
ing amendments surged and prompted Senator Sam J. Ervin to introduce
a bill on August 17, 1967 to establish procedures for calling a constitutional
convention. 1 This bill passed the Senate in 1971,2 and again in 1973,83
but was not considered by the House either time and failed to become law.
On March 26, 1981, ostensibly in response to the current states' drive
for a constitutional convention, Senator Orrin G. Hatch introduced a bill
(S. 817) to establish procedures for implementing it."4 S. 817 differs in
many respects from the Ervin bill. The Ervin bill gave a more active role
to Congress in determining the validity of the state applications. The rules
of procedure for adopting or rescinding a state resolution requesting the
convention call would have been determinable by Congress under the Ervin
bill, where S. 817 makes this8" and questions concerning compliance with
the rules determinable by the state legislatures.86 Unlike the Ervin bill, S. 817
does not provide a mechanism for Congress to invalidate a state applica-
tion initially. Congress may make a determination of validity only upon
receipt of thirty-four applications on the same general subject. The one
basis for invalidating an application is if Congress determines it is not of
the "same general subject"87 as the others. After Congress determines that
there are "valid applications made by two-thirds or more of the States for
the calling of a constitutional convention,""8 it is under a duty to call the
convention.
Aside from a clear attempt to limit the scope of authority of a con-
stitutional convention by narrowly defining its agenda to one general sub-
ject, S. 817, in effect, gives Congress a veto power over any amendments
79 ABA, SPECIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION STUDY COMMITTEE, AMENDMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION METHOD UNDER ARTICLE V 74 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as ABA Report]. See also THE ARTICLE V CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS - A SYMPOSIUM
1 (L. Levy ed. 1971) for Senator Dirkser's position.
80 ABA Report, supra note 79, at 3.
SlId. at 4. See S. Rep. No. 336, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 117 CONG. REc. 36803 (1971).
82 ABA Report, supra note 79, at 4.
8 3 Id. at n. +.
84See supra note 12.
85 S. 817, § 3(a), 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. S2794 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1981).
8ald. at § 3(b).
8? Id. at § 6(a). Section 2(a) requires that the state resolution set forth "the general object of
the amendment or amendments to be proposed."
88 ld. at § .6(a).
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emanating from it. According to the scheme proposed by S. 817, if the
convention does not abide by the limitations and proposes amendment(s)
outside the general subject matter for which the convention is called, Con-
gress could by concurrent resolution refuse to submit such proposed amend-
ment(s) to the states for ratification.89 This is ironic in light of the recent
remarks by the sponsor of this bill that its main purpose is to ensure that
Congress would only be empowered to call the convention, and that it would
not be "in a position to undermine the convention process."9 There is grave
doubt that Congress would be empowered at all to restrict, limit or otherwise
circumscribe the authority of a convention to address any issue it deemed in
the national interest. Legislative history and the historical model indicate
that there is no foundation for the kind of Congressional control over the
convention that S. 817 envisions.9
VI. THE STATE APPLICATIONS AND SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 58
The recent state applications9 seeking a constitutional convention to
propose an amendment requiring a balanced federal budget have taken
several forms. State applications have variously called for an amendment
to balance the federal budget (seven states)," to insure that federal ap-
propriations for any fiscal year not exceed the total of federal estimated
revenues (twenty states)," to prohibit federal deficit-spending," to prohibit
federal costs from exceeding income," and to prohibit federal expenditures
from exceeding revenues.97 Of those states included in the appropriations/
revenues formula, two would exclude any federal revenues derived from
borrowing in the total estimate of federal revenues for that fiscal year.98
Also within this appropriations/revenues formula, two states would not only
prohibit any increase in the national debt but would require that it be re-
paid.99 One state would have the amendment establish a procedure for
89 Id. at § 11(b). The Ervin bill also contains such a provision.
90 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2449 (Dec. 12, 1981).
9 1 See supra text accompanying notes 29-45.
92 See App. p. 750, infra.
93 Florida, Georgia, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon and Texas. See App. at
p. 750, infra.
94AIabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. See App. at p. 750, infra.
95 Colorado, S.J. Mem. 1, 125 CONG. REc. S1306 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
96 Delaware, H.C. Res. 36, 125 CONG. REc. S1307 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
97 North Dakota, S.C. Res. 4018, 125 CONG. R c. S1310 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
9s Arizona, S.J. Res. 1002, H.C. Mem. 2320, 125 CONG. Rac. S1306 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1979); South Carolina, S.C. Res. 1024, S.C.R. 670, 125 CONG. REc. S1311 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 1979).
99 Louisiana and Mississippi would have the national debt repaid within 100 years following
the date of ratification of such appropriations/revenues formula amendment with the rate
of repayment to be not less than one-tenth of the debt principal for each ten-year period.
Louisiana, S.C. Res. 4, S. Res. 73, H.C. Res. 269, 125 CoNG. Rac. S1307 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1979); Mississippi, H.C. Res. 51, 125 CONG. REc. S1308 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
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amortizing the national debt.' 0 All the state applications focus on restraint
and reduction of federal spending.
The issue remains of how binding upon Congress these applications
will be. Many of the state applications call for the Article V convention
as an alternative to the inaction of Congress on this matter."0 1 Other ap-
plications contain a "self-destruct" provision stating that if Congress pro-
poses a similar amendment to that proposed by the state, the application
will be deemed "null and void, rescinded, and of no effect." '' More than
half of the state applications ask Congress to propose an amendment, but
unlike those few with the self-desruct provisions, it is unclear what the
effect of Congress' proposal will be if it differs from the scheme proposed
by each state petition. Many of the state applications specifically denote
that they are to be considered "continuing applications". Others, however,
imposed a deadline for Congress to propose an amendment, which has
now expired.0 3 Presumably, any amendment proposed by Congress would
have no effect on this latter group. These conflicting provisions among the
state applications must be carefully analyzed in regard to the impact of the
newly-proposed congressional amendment, S.J. Res. 58, which has been
sent by its committee to the Senate floor.u"
This 97th Congress has made prodigous efforts to alter the Constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in recent years. In less
than a month, 83 bills to amend the Constitution were introduced.0 5 In
the first four months of its First Session, 145 Constitutional amendments
were offered, including proposals for a balanced federal budget, school busing
to achieve racial integration, prayer in public schools, abortion, and banning
racial quotas.' Concurrently, certain factions within Congress have at-
tempted to strip the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in five general areas:
prayer in the schools, abortion, school busing, a males-only draft and state
court rulings.'
Amid this barrage S.J. Res. 58 proposes that the Constitution be amended
0OTexas, H.C. Res. 13, H.C. Res. 31, 125 CoNG. REC. S1312 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
1o See supra note 8.
102 Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, New Hampshire and South Dakota. See App. at 750, infra.
Cf. supra note 9 for states using general language to the same effect in their applications at
p. 750, infra.
103 Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina and Oregon. See App. at p. 750, infra.
'o
4 See supra note 17.
205 Fritchey, The Rush to Amendment, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1981, at A17, col. a.
106 Will, The Folly of a Constitutional Convention, Wash. Post May 21, 1981, at A27,
col. C.
107 Wicker, Court-Stripping, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1981, at A3 1, col. 1. Wicker feels that
some legislators are pursuing the jurisdictional court-stripping plan because they do not have
sufficient votes to pass a constitutional amendment on any of these issues.
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to require a balanced federal budget and to limit taxing and spending.08
One of its sponsors and a longtime proponent of this type of measure, Sen-
ator Strom Thurmond, observed that this measure was riding the momentum
when it was successfully voted from subcommittee to full committee.'
In a letter to the editor of the Washington Post, Senator Thurmond explained
his position on the need for such an amendment: Congress has not shown
the necessary budgetary restraint in the past, and public opinion favors it."'
He made reference to the states' drive for a convention on this issue."'
But the proposed amendment has met with opposition both in Congress and
in the press." 2
S.J. Res. 58 was designed to remedy the alleged "spending bias" in
the present system of federal expenditures. According to the committee re-
port, Congress has no incentive for balancing the budget. In fact, the argu-
ment continues, Congress is subject to two contradictory political forces
which together tend to increase the federal deficit. These forces are the in-
ducement to spend in response to the demands of their constituency and
political pressure groups, and the countervailing pressure not to raise taxes
to offset these expenditures at the expense of their political well-being."'
Section 1 was intended to establish a norm of a balanced federal bud-
get by requiring that for any fiscal year the "total outlays [be] no greater
108 S.J. Res. 58 states:
Section 1. Prior to each fiscal year, the Congress shall adopt a statement of receipts
and outlays for that year in which total outlays are no greater than total receipts. The
Congress may amend such statement provided revised outlays are no greater than revised
receipts. Whenever three-fifths of the whole number of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, Congress in such statement may provide for a specific excess of outlays over
receipts by a vote directed solely to that subject. The Congress and the President shall
ensure that actual outlays do not exceed the outlays set forth in such statement.
Section 2. Total receipts for any fiscal year set forth in the statement adopted pur-
suant to this article shall not increase by a rate greater than the rate of increase in
national income in the last calendar year ending before such fiscal year, unless a majority
of the whole number of both Houses of Congress shall have passed a bill directed
solely to approving specific additional receipts and such bill has become law.
Section 3. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal
year in which a declaration of war is in effect.
Section 4. The Congress may not require that the States engage in additional activities
without compensation equal to the additional costs.
Section 5. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United States except those
derived from borrowing and total outlays shall include all outlays of the United States
except those for repayment of debt principal.
Section 6. This article shall take effect for the second fiscal year beginning after its
ratification. Reprinted in S. Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981).
109 Panel Backs Balanced Budget Amendment, Wash. Post, May 8, 1981, at A3, col. c.
J10 Thurmond, Balanced Budgets and the Constitution, Wash. Post, Mar. 20, 1981, at A22,
Col. c.
M Id.
112 See Moynihan, The Imprudence of Forcing a Balanced Budget, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1981,
at 28, col. 4; Mathias, For the Record, Wash. Post, May 7, 1981, at A18, col. e. See also
[Editorial], The Amendment is a Fake, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1981, at A14, col. a; [Edito-
rial], Tinkertoy Amendment, Wash. Post, May 26, 1891, at A18, col. a.
1:3$. Rep. No. 151, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 10. This statement is attributed to Professor Roger
Freeman of the Hoover Institute.
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than total receipts.""' However, even under this proposed scheme Congress
could continue to engage in deficit spending upon a three-fifths vote of both
Houses approving a specific level of deficit." 5 In addition to establishing
a balanced federal budget as the norm, S.J. Res. 58 also attempts to
eliminate "tax bracket creep," another "spending bias" resulting from Con-
gressional access to annual, automatic tax increases. Section 2 provides a
tax indexing by which the level of receipts for any fiscal year would be no
greater proportionally than that of the prior fiscal year. However, this ceiling
on federal receipts could be overcome by a majority vote of both Houses.""
Section 3 authorizes Congress to waive the requirements of this scheme
for any year in which a declaration of war is in effect. Of the eight state
applications which offer a text for a balanced budget amendment, all in-
clude some provision for a suspension of the requirements in the event of
a national emergency and/or declaration of war."' However, the similarity
ends there." 8 One state would vest this authority in the President of the
United States.1'" Others would vest the authority for the intial determination
of a national emergency in the President but would require the affirmance
of Congress by a two-thirds vote. 2 Still others would vest this authority
in Congress, either by a majority vote 1' or by a three-fourths vote of both
Houses."1
S.J. Res. 58 includes a provision not found in the state applications.
Section 4 precludes Congress from passing on the costs of any new, un-
reimbursed programs to the states. This provision was designed to prevent
Congress from circumventing "the limitation imposed by this amendment
upon its spending and taxing authority.""'
S.J. Res. 58 has recently cleared committee and is ready for floor
debate in the Senate. It must be passed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses
before it can be referred to the states for ratification." 4 If this occurs, at
least twenty of the state applications will no longer be of any effect, if the
114 S.J. Res. 58, § 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. S2905 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1981).
215 Id.
16Id, at § 2.
117 Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Wyoming. See App. at p. 750, infra.
118 But see 125 CONG. RIc. S1307 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979). The application of Delaware is
identical to § 3 in this respect.
"1 South Carolina, S.C. Res. 1024, S.C. Res. 670, 125 CONG. REC. S1311 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1979). Any extension would be granted in one-year intervals by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses.
120 Maryland, Tennessee and Wyoming. See App. at p. 750, infra.
221 North Dakota, S.C. Res. 4018, 125 CONG. REc. S1310 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1979).
122 Louisiana and Mississippi. See App. at p. 750, infra.
23See supra note 113, at 11.
124 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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plain-meaning of their words is accepted."' These include the applications
asking for a constitutional convention in the event that Congress does not
propose an amendment, and applications containing a "self-destruct" provis-
ion upon Congress proposing the desired amendment. However, some states
have not conditioned their call on Congressional action; presumably, those
applications will continue even if Congress does pass S.J. Res. 58.1" With
twenty states dropped from the tally, those applications would effectively
be nullified as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
If S.J. Res. 58 fails to be passed by Congress, the current thirty ap-
plications for constitutional convention will continue to have effect. The
prospect of a constitutional convention, shrouded with doubt and confusion
as to its scope and authority, draws nearer. In 1981, state resolutions
applying for a constitutional convention have been adopted in one house
of four states, and Vermont is on the verge of passing a joint resolution. '
Equally uncertain is the fate of S. 817. If it becomes law in 1982, and if
it can withstand a constitutional attack, an implementing procedure will
be established for a convention. Four current state applications will have
expired in 1982, however, and under S. 817 there will be no duty to call
the convention unless these applications are renewed, or four others are
tendered in their place. 2 ' But if four separate and additional state applica-
tions are tendered to Congress in 1982 to bring the tally to the necessary
two-thirds (thirty-four states) as required under Article V, then these
four otherwise-expired applications will be given new life and will be counted
in the tally.'29 At that point Congress must put into motion the implementing
procedure for a political assembly, the likes of which were last seen in
1787. "Before the next convention is called, perhaps someone will explain
who will play the demanding role of James Madison. Who will play Alex-
ander Hamilton, who Benjamin Franklin?' 3 0
VIII. ADDENDUM
The Reagan administration is still struggling with the federal budget.
It has projected that another $345 billion will be added to the $1 trillion
125 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. See App. at p. 750, infra.
226 Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota and Oregon. The
resolution of Mississippi requires that for it to abandon its application, Congress must pro-
pose an amendment identical to the text of the amendment within the application. SJ. Res.
58 is not identical. See App. at p. 750, infra.
127 See Moynihan, supra note 112, at 28.
128S. 817, § 5(a) 97th Cong., Ist Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2794 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1981).
See also App. p. 750, infra for the year of adoption of the resolutions of Delaware, Mary-
land, Mississippi and North Dakota.
129 id.
13 Will, The Folly of a Constitutional Convention, Wash. Post, May 21, 1981, at A27,
col. C.
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national debt over fiscal years 1982 to 1985."' The proponents of the bal-
anced budget amendment have been aided by the scope of the projected
federal deficit in their efforts to secure passage of the amendment.'32 In mid-
January of this year, Alaska became the thirty-first state to apply to Congress
for a constitutional convention. 3' Its legislature passed a joint resolution
petitioning Congress to either propose a balanced budget amendment or
call a constitutional convention." ' In March, the state of Washington was
close to passing a convention call, but it was removed by the state Senate." 5
The Ohio Senate has passed a resolution, but it still awaits approval by
the House." 6 According to some observers, similar resolutions have a good
likelihood of passage this year by the Kentucky and Missouri legislatures."'
At the time of this printing, a total of nine states have approved a resolution
in one house of their respective legislatures."'
MARYANNE R. RACKOFF
'3' Rodino, Opinion and Commentary: Should the Constitution Be Amended to Balance the
Federal Budget? Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 10, 1982, at 23, col. 4.
"' Wash. Post, Feb. 23, 1982, at 17, col. a. The National Tax Limitation Committee has
recently concluded a massive mailing effort of 3.2 million items. Cowan, Balancing the Bud-
get - By Law, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 3, at 6, col. 3.
133 Grier, Balanced Budget Amendment - On the Move, Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22,
1982, at Al, col. 1.
14 H.J. Res. 17. The text of Alaska's application has not yet been published in the Con-
gressional Record. See 128 Cong. Rec. H200 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1982) for a notation of the
receipt of H.J. Res. 17 by Congress. Telephone interview with a staff member of Rep. John
F. Seiberling's office, 14th Cong. District Ohio, Longworth House Office Building, Washing-
ton, D.C. (Apr. 12 and 13, 1982).
15 S.J. Res. No. 1. H.J. Mem. No. 1 included the convention call, but on March 11, 1982,
the Senate passed S.J. Res. No. 1 with the convention call omitted. Telephone interview
with David Keating, Legislative Director of the National Taxpayers Union, Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 12, 1982).
136 Grant, Editorial Commentary: Pass the 27th Amendment, and Make a Balanced Budget
the Law of the Land, Barron's, Feb. 22, 1982, at 11, col. 1. The Ohio Senate adopted S.J.
Res. No. 1 on February 10, 1981; the resolution was referred to committee in the House on
March 11, 1981, where it remains. Telephone interview with Frances Haney, Legislative
Information Office, State Building, Columbus, Ohio (Apr. 12, 1982).
137 See Grier, supra note 133, at 14, col. 2. See also Constitutional Ploy: Congress Pushes a
Balanced Budget Amendment with Spending Limits, to Beat States to the Punch, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 26, 1982, at 42, col. 1.
138 See Grant, supra note 136, at col. 4.
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